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Introduction
Declarations from US Presidents since WWII have championed values as the linchpin for US national 
security and foreign policy, however, current Secretary of State Tillerson has been a vocal advocate for 
removing the ‘promotion of democracy’ from State’s mission statement as well as the separation of values 
and policy.[1]  Moreover, the nascent Trump administration has been open in its chagrin toward the State 
Department, diplomacy and multilateral fora in particular and has prioritised pursuing “constructive, 
results-oriented bilateral relations.”[2] This line of thinking is a direct reflection of President Trump’s 
inauguration speech in which he declared that the US would not impose its values on others.[3]  The 
Secretary told a meeting of departmental staff in May 2017, that the “fundamental values of freedom, 
human dignity, the way people are treated” guide US policy, but they “are not our policies.”[4] Tillerson 
declared that “sometimes values have to take a back seat to economic interests or national security.”[5]
The Secretary concluded that “interests come first, and then if we can advocate and advance our values, 
we should.”[6] This approach raises several questions such as: will the US’s allies and partners follow suit; 
what will be the long-term outcome of an ‘overt’ separation of interests and values; and more importantly, 
can diplomacy, the core of Western-led global stabilization efforts, survive the ‘new’ norm?
Given the Trump administration’s decision to send another 4000 troops in Afghanistan to ‘win’ a war 
which began in 2001, and in light of the administration apparent disdain for diplomacy and State; it’s an 
appropriate time to reflect upon the role of diplomacy in the War on Terror (WoT) through the years of 
the Bush and Obama administrations. This paper contends that diplomacy has operated at the front and 
centre of the WoT ever since the Twin Towers fell yet it’s one analytical perspective that’s missing from 
current assessments. We argue that meaningful analysis of the WoT is incomplete without acknowledging 
the vital role diplomacy has played in the conflict.
The War on Terror (WoT) dramatically altered international, domestic and human security the world over. 
After 9/11, the United States of America (U.S.A.) launched two major operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
and has led numerous Intel., covert or ‘black’ operations ever since. In 2016, a Watson Institute of 
International and Public Affairs report calculated U.S expenditure “through 2016: as $4.79 trillion and 
counting” making the WoT the most expensive in the United States’ (U.S.) history.[7] In addition, a vast 
terror industry is now engrained in America’s domestic security architecture. The Department of 
Homeland Security, the National Counterterrorism Centre, and the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence are but three of the “1,271 government organizations and 1,931 private companies [that] work 
on programs related to counterterrorism, homeland security and intelligence.”[8] Similar developments 
have occurred in other nations involved in the WoT – France, the United Kingdom, and Australia, for 
example - though not quite on the same scale. The War has also exacted a significant cost in terms of 
human security and life. Hundreds of thousands of combatants and non-combatants have had their lives 
irrevocably altered, or lost them altogether.[9]
Despite these costs, the enemy continues to proliferate. Al Qa’ida inspired groups such as Boko Haram, 
ISIL, Lashkar e-Taiba and Abu Sayyaf Group now operate across an arc of political instability that 
stretches from the west coast of Africa to South-East Asia. Their toxic anti-western ideology has inspired 
devastating attacks from Brussels to Nice to Orlando, Florida; attacks which are increasing in both scale 
and frequency. Since 2000, there has been a ninefold increase in terrorism, with 32,658 people killed in 
2014 alone - the highest annual total since terrorist attack rates were first collated in 1964.[10]
The WoT looks set to continue for decades, a bleak opinion shared by leading academics such as Pape, 
Chowdhury and Fitzsimmons and Lister.[11] Byman agrees, writing that:
... the United States and its allies must accept the inevitability of a large, global movement 
bent on murder as a form of political expression. Ultimate victory, when it comes, will take 
decades rather than years.[12]
Practitioners also remain doubtful of any immediate conclusion to the War.  CIA Deputy Director Michael 
Morrel acknowledges that there has been “a reduction of the threat from the original al Qa’ida” but “it is 
safe say Islamic extremism is likely to be with us for generations.”[13] Similarly, former Pentagon chief 
Leon Panetta, former CIA/NSA Director General Michael Hayden, and current Chairman of the JCOS 
General Joseph Dunford all predict a thirty-year battle against radical Islamic terrorism.[14] Cleary, the 
U.S. and its allies have reached an “indefinite stalemate” or “strategic pause” in the battle against the 
growing threat of international terrorism.[15]
Arguably, how the WoT is analysed by higher research institutions and think tanks has also reached some 
type of stalemate. The study of the WoT is dominated by International Relations (IR) mainstays such as 
Strategic Studies, Political Science, and Foreign Policy Analysis, alongside new concepts such as Social 
Movement Theory (a.k.a. the deradicalization model), and/or Social Network Analysis. This paper 
contends that one analytical perspective is missing: diplomacy, which has operated at the front and centre 
of the War ever since the Twin Towers fell.
Any meaningful analysis of the WoT is incomplete without acknowledging the vital role diplomacy has 
played in the conflict. Summit, defence and secret diplomacy, for example, have been crucial to all state 
efforts, strategies and policies, as have newer iterations such as public, digital and even sports diplomacy. 
Non-state actors such as L-3 Services (formerly Titan Corporation) form part of a complex, global and 
plural counter terrorism (CT) diplomatic network. And, like it or loathe it, increasingly sophisticated 
terrorist organisations such as ISIL also engage in diplomacy. To paraphrase Bull,[16]they too gather and 
disseminate information, communicate, negotiate, and symbolise (or represent) a struggle to 
disenfranchised groups, nations and people around the world. No academic study has described and 
analysed these diplomatic networks, a deficiency or ‘gap’ this paper seeks to address.[17]
In terms of structure this paper simply describes, maps and validates different types of WoT diplomacy. 
Actors central to the War are grouped in three categories - traditional, non-traditional and radical which 
provides three neat sections. The first concentrates on traditional, state-qua-state diplomacy in the WoT 
while the second focuses on non-state actors. The third section substantiates the diplomacy of terror, that 
is, the means which terrorist organisations (TOs) employ to realise political ends. The paper concludes 
with a number of theoretical and practical recommendations. Three parameters also bear mention at the 
outset. First, the paper generally focuses on U.S. diplomacy, counter-terrorism and policy. It does so 
because the U.S. has been at the forefront of the WoT. Lessons learned are, however, applicable to other 
allies participating in the War. Second, due to the scope and complexity of the conflict it is unrealistic to 
describe every diplomatic actor, incident, policy and case, therefore the paper provides a general, meta-
review of diplomacy’s role in the WoT, in a grand, abstract theoretical sense. Third, the paper does not 
evaluate the effectiveness of diplomacy in the WoT. As a first step to generating a deeper understanding 
of diplomacy in the WoT it merely describes, maps and validates. The end result is a framework which 
will be useful to guide future scholarship.
Ideally, this survey will raise the profile of diplomacy in the fight against terrorism. In turn, the paper 
seeks to complement the body of IR literature that relates to the WoT, fill a gap in the canon of diplomatic 
studies, and instigate further discussion, collaboration and inter-disciplinary analysis between theorists 
and practitioners allied to a common purpose.
The WoT and Traditional Diplomacy
The 9/11 attacks “triggered the most rapid and dramatic change in the history of U.S. foreign policy.”[18]
On the 20th of September, 2001, after nine days of concerted national introspection, President George W. 
Bush stated that:
… our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there…We will direct every resource 
at our command…every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law 
enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war…to the destruction 
and to the defeat of the global terror network…We will make no distinction between the terrorists 
who committed these acts and those who harbor them...Every nation has a choice to make...In this 
conflict, there is no neutral ground...You're either with us or you are with the terrorists.[19]
The War aimed to deny “sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists” and “diminish the underlying 
conditions that terrorists seek to exploit.”[20] To achieve these goals the U.S developed and quickly 
implemented JP 3-26 Counterterrorism, a Whole-of-Government strategy led by military and federal law 
enforcement agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigations, Department of Homeland Security and 
Department of Treasury.
Shortly after, on 7 October, 2001, the official military response to 9/11 began.  Operation Enduring 
Freedom (OEF) was launched in Afghanistan, led by the U.S., and with the assistance of the United 
Kingdom and 138 other Coalition partners. The primary aims of OEF echoed U.S. policy: find Usama bin 
Laden, dismantle al Qa’ida, and deny it a safe base of operations by removing the Taliban from power. 
This mission expanded in subsequent years with the invasion of Iraq, multi-national Special Forces 
operations in Yemen, North Africa, and the Afghanistan/Pakistan border region, as well as extraordinary 
rendition programs operated by coalition intelligence agencies in clandestine locations throughout the 
world.
Diplomacy, the “engine room of international affairs”, has played a vital role in every effort described 
above.[21] Such a role is often visible, familiar and recognisable, yet often understudied, understated and 
underappreciated. Defined in a classical sense as “the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of 
official relations between governments”, traditional diplomacy is the key historical mechanism by which 
states achieve their foreign policy goals in complex international relations system.[22] The proverbial 
means to an end, traditional diplomacy has been the sole enabler for summit, defence, secret and public 
diplomacy in the WoT. Each of these categories of the “dialogue between states” is introduced and 
substantiated below.[23]
Summit Diplomacy
Summit diplomacy - defined simply as “meetings between incumbent heads of government and/or state, 
or political leaders”[24]- is a common practice in international relations. From Westphalia to Vienna to 
Versailles summits are advantageous for states for many reasons. They are often faster, cheaper and more 
efficient than traditional, bi-lateral meetings between states. Because summits advance “negotiations 
between numerous parties simultaneously”, bargaining and transaction costs are substantially reduced.[25]
And, most importantly, collective courses of political agreement can be reached over a short period of 
time. Such benefits have been evident in the WoT across three broad summit formats: U.S.-led, regional 
and global.
In February, 2015, for example, the U.S. invited sixty leaders of the coalition against ISIL to Washington 
D.C. for the Summit on Countering Violent Extremism (the first of three CVE summits held around the 
world that year).[26] Chiefly, the summit focussed on domestic deradicalization and the need for Coalition 
partners to “empower communities to protect their families and friends and neighbours from violent 
ideologies and recruitment.”[27] Diplomats present agreed to work closely together in order to “create a 
counter-narrative using technology and people-to-people dialogue across cultures, and to facilitate partner 
governments to institutionalize development programs that focus on individual economic empowerment 
and improving education.”[28] All agreed the summit was a success. Delegates presented a united front, 
three phase recommendations emerged,[29] and, at its conclusion, the U.S. diplomat-in-chief, Barrack 
Obama, correctly noted that:
... we all recognize the need for more dialogues across countries and cultures. But what’s 
most needed today, perhaps, are more dialogues within countries -- not just across faiths, but 
also within faiths…we need to build and bolster bridges of communication and trust.[30]
The dialogue, communication and trust building measures Obama spoke of fall under the ambit of 
diplomacy, the “mediation of estrangement” between separate states.[31]
Regional state summits have also been important. In 2002, for instance, the Eighth ASEAN Summit in 
Phnom Penh issued a Declaration on Terrorism, a timely statement given the terrorist attacks in Bali, 
Indonesia and in the cities of Zamboanga and Quezon in the Philippines earlier in the same year. Several 
spinoff summits were generated by the Phnom Penh leader’s meeting, such as the Inter-Sessional Meeting 
on Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime in early 2003, the 2007 ASEAN Convention on Counter 
Terrorism, and the 2015 East Asia Summit on Countering Violent Extremism. In addition, the Regional 
Counter-Terrorism Centre in Malaysia has been highly effective.  Opened in July 2003, the CT Centre 
traces its origin to the original 2002 summit.
In terms of fully inclusive, global summits, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) is the most 
obvious symbol of the international society of states. Composed of 193 member states, the UNGA has 
been productive and proactive in fighting terrorism. In 2006, for example, the UNGA entered a new phase 
of institutionalised CT by reaching agreement on a global strategy to counter terrorism. The result was the 
UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which seeks to reduce “conditions conducive to the spread of 
terrorism; to prevent and combat terrorism; to take measures to build state capacity; to strengthen the role 
of the United Nations in combating terrorism; and to ensure the respect of human rights while countering 
terrorism.”[32] This Resolution articulates the strategic direction and objectives of the global CT efforts 
since 9/11. In total the UNGA has implemented thirty-five related Resolutions, demonstrating that it is a 
vital diplomatic cog in the fight against terrorism.[33]
Summits matter in the WoT. They bring together prominent politicians, security specialists and 
representative from law enforcement agencies, create both formal and informal opportunities for 
negotiations, and often produce agreement on collective courses of action. They also shore up national, 
regional and international security efforts, and generate a series of horizontal and vertical channels for co-
ordinated and ongoing communication between member states. International meetings, common 
agreement and collective action are crucial because, obviously, international terrorism cannot be defeated 
by one state.
Defence Diplomacy
A second type of state-centric diplomacy in the WoT is defence diplomacy, “the collective application of 
pacific and/or cooperative initiatives by national defense establishments and military practitioners for 
confidence building, trust creation, conflict prevention, and/or conflict resolution.”[34] Defence diplomacy 
involves a range of government departments but is always directed by Ministries of Foreign Affairs 
(MFAs). It is therefore best understood as the “peaceful application by a state of resources from across the 
spectrum of defence, for the purpose of achieving positive outcomes in the development of bilateral and 
multilateral relationships … using defence assets to support diplomatic objectives and further defence 
interests.”[35]
In the U.S. context there is a strong historical connection between its diplomatic and military 
establishments, stemming from the Munroe Doctrine of the early nineteenth century through to the 
present. Once more, the Department of State performs a vital role.  It formulates, manages and reviews 
U.S. defence diplomacy and it liaises directly with the Pentagon as well as similar agencies abroad. U.S. 
defence diplomacy aims to build the capacity of allies, and destabilise that of so-called enemy or rogue 
states that may provide support for terrorist activities.
Defence diplomacy is occasionally referred to as “strategic engagement”[36] because it supports the senior 
partner’s “long-term strategic goals to restrict future threats and shape the international order.”[37]
Through ad-hoc, threat specific groupings, defence diplomacy forms the core of burden-sharing and 
capacity building initiatives such as the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT’s) in Afghanistan, which 
facilitate U.S./Afghan civil-military engagement in the areas of governance, security, economics and 
development.[38] The International Security Assistance Force’s mission in Afghanistan (2003-2014) 
perhaps provides the best example of U.S. defence diplomacy facilitating an effective and unified CT 
response to a specific terrorist threat. Little wonder then that U.S. scholars such as Cottey and Forester 
(2004) and practitioners like current SECDEF Ash Carter (2016) fully support defence diplomacy as the 
ideal War medium for conflict prevention and reduction.[39]
Secret Diplomacy
A third type of diplomacy evident in the WoT is secret diplomacy, the “practice of intentionally 
concealing information from other governments, the media and/or the public.”[40] Secret diplomacy can 
also involve private, informal and clandestine backchannel meetings – particularly between states or state 
and non-state actors that share a publically adversarial relationship - as well as any number of activities 
associated with the murky world of intelligence gathering. 
In the WoT secrecy provides significant political and diplomatic utility, particularly for the U.S. As 
Bowman notes, clandestine action, as a mechanism for influencing behaviours, has a long history within 
the Department of State, the Secret Intelligence Bureau (SIB), various U.S. Military Intelligence 
Divisions, the Diplomatic Security Service and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).[41] There is a 
plethora of examples to choose from. Recently, for example, the Obama administration drastically reduced 
the number of Guantanamo Bay detainees by negotiating transfers to third party countries in a far from 
transparent process.  In 2014, after two years of covert back-and-forth, representatives from State secured 
the release of Army Sgt. Bo Bergdahl from the Taliban. The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action to 
limit Iran’s nuclear weapons program (which, in turn, brought Persia into the War’s Middle East theatre) 
was finalized after lengthy discussions brokered by and conducted in Oman, again in the utmost secrecy. 
In fact, many of the programs which underpin U.S. global CT efforts have been created and maintained 
through secrecy. Covert programs such as extraordinary renditions, global ‘black sites,’ suspicionless 
surveillance and warrantless arrest and detention could simply not function with full transparency.
While newspapers like The Guardian and hacktivists such as Julian Assange continue to decry these 
practices as archaic and unrepresentative of the open and transparent digital age they are certain to 
continue in the WoT. If anything, the last fifteen years have embedded Intelligence, covert operations and 
back-channel negotiation as essential strategic assets in the fight against terrorism.[42] This is unlikely to 
change in the coming decades.
Public Diplomacy
Public diplomacy, “the process by which direct relations with people in a country are pursued to advance 
the interests and extend the values of those being represented”, has been extremely active throughout the 
WoT.[43]  They key word in this definition is values, an element of PD which “sets it apart from classical 
diplomacy” and its fixation on issues and interests.[44] Public diplomacy uses a variety of mediums such 
as television, radio, digital platforms such as YouTube, the internet, and so on, to “build and manage 
relationships; and influence thoughts and mobilize actions” to advance both the sending state’s interests 
and values.[45] These days, public diplomacy is an essential form of “diplomatic engagement.”[46]
Putting theory into practice, we turn to State, who realised the importance of public diplomacy from the 
outset of the War. Inspired initially by Charlotte Beers, Under-Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy 
and Public Affairs from 2001-2003, State has since produced countless public diplomacy innovations, 
many of which were mimicked by other Coalition partners. Under Beers’ administration, an impressive 
suite of public diplomacy operations was established as a way of reaching out to disenfranchised youth 
across the Middle East, Asia and Africa. Muslim Life in America, a booklet published by the State 
Department in 2009, proved popular and led to the establishment of the Council of American Muslims for 
Understanding. State also partnered with the Smithsonian Institute to create virtual reality tours of 
American suburbs. These tours showcased the multicultural aspects of life in the U.S and captured “the 
essence and value of U.S freedom and democracy.”[47] The Arabic language Radio Sawa (together) and 
the al Hurrah (the free) television station, were developed by the Department to show the ‘Arab street’ the 
best of “American culture” and win “them over to American values.”[48] More recently, the Center for 
Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC) has become a potent public diplomacy mechanism 
for State to counter anti-American messaging across the digital spectrum. The CSCC, for example, has 
quickly mastered low tech audio streaming as a way to target “less literature audiences” in areas where 
ISIL operates.[49] And, finally, the video Think Again, Turn Away is perhaps the best-known example of 
the U.S. State Department’s intention to combat ISIL’s formidable online presence head-on.
Digital Diplomacy
For Westcott, the revolutions in Information and Communications Technology (ICT) have multiplied and 
amplified the number of voices and interests involved in international policy-making.[50] In addition, the 
revolution has accelerated the dissemination of information, and enabled traditional diplomatic services to 
be delivered faster and more cost-effectively. Poignantly, Deos and Pigman claim that the internet has 
become “the central nervous system of international relations.”[51] In this brave new digital world “old 
phenomena take on new dimensions” and new technologies can seamlessly integrate elements of 
traditional state diplomacy and boost the pursuit of the aforementioned objectives of public diplomacy.[52]
All of these developments are encapsulated in a rapidly growing area of theory and practice called digital 
diplomacy.
Digital diplomacy is “the use of social media for diplomatic purposes”[53] or, more specifically, the 
exploitation “of the internet and information communications technology in order to carry out diplomatic 
objectives, or solve foreign policy problems.”[54] It markedly improves a core function of diplomacy - the 
collection, development, management and dissemination of information for diplomatic practitioners –and 
greatly amplify the number of recipients for a message.
State has directed considerable resources to the digital realm (or cyber, as they refer to it) as the forth 
domain of the WoT (alongside land, sea and air). States digital presence allows it to focus on interrupting 
the online radicalisation process, disseminating targeted messaging to vulnerable communities and 
creating a sustainable counter-narrative. State also uses its enhanced multi-domain connectivity to 
overcome challenges to their command of ‘war time’ information by cyber-savvy terrorists.
In order to improve State’s digital capacity, and to win the hearts and minds of international online 
communities, former U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell established the Office of e-Diplomacy in 2002. 
Since then it has “been responsible for some terrific innovations” directly related to the WoT.[55] For 
example, the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC) and the Office of Digital 
Engagement use digital technology to counter the tens of thousands of pro-ISIL uploads and tweets daily 
by developing multi-language presence across multiple social media platforms such as Facebook, Tumblr 
and YouTube. Using these platforms and the Internet, CSCC’s Digital Outreach Team is “tightly focused 
on countering extremism” by addressing misinformation, highlighting the hypocritical and illegitimate 
nature of extremist rhetoric and continually undermine the extremist narrative “among the Arabic 
blogosphere.”[56] Likewise, State’s Virtual Presence Posts “combine web technology, travel, media 
outreach” enabling millions of local citizens, particularly young people, to interact with embassy 
personnel in states where access to U.S. diplomatic staff are limited or non-existent.[57]
Digital diplomacy has increased States connection to foreign governments and NGO’s through multi-
disciplinary communication hubs and diplomatic support staff use analytic software to create and 
distribute thematic guidance’s on anti-ISIL topics “to nearly 3,000 U.S.G officials as well as Coalition 
partners on a daily basis.”[58] Scholars such as Nolan and Riordan suggest that digital diplomacy’s scope, 
adaptability and dynamism equip policy makers and diplomatic practitioners with powerful tools to 
enhance the levers of national power. State’s experience confirms this observation.[59]
This first section concentrated on traditional diplomacy in the WoT, a quiet operator compared to the 
more visible, high-profile kinetic military and/or law enforcement aspects of the WoT. Without 
diplomacy, however, none of these offensive, more prominent aspects would be possible. Ministries of 
Foreign Affairs (MFAs) such as State have incorporated many new front-line services to combat global 
terrorism and are paragons of the type of “policy innovation and institutional adaptation” needed to take 
the fight to TOs.[60] Melissen agrees, recognising that “the state is more resilient than is sometimes 
suggested and one should not underestimate the innovative capacity of state-based diplomacy.”[61]
Diplomacy has allowed governments to understand foreign cultures, attitudes, and behaviour, to build and 
strengthen existing relationships, and to influence and mobilize actions to advance their core interests and 
values. Diplomacy, in other words, has been an invaluable tool of CT. Kleiner adroitly notes that “the 
fight against terrorism has strengthened state authority,” because populations turn to their governments in 
times of crisis.[62] State, their MFAs and their diplomats, however, are not the only actor of significance 
in the WoT.
Non-Governmental Organisations, Networked Diplomacy and The WoT
Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are just as dynamic in the WoT as states. Old and new media 
organisations and outlets, for example, produce a constant stream of emotive imagery and information 
from war zones, often in real time fashion. Doctors and nurses from Médecins Sans Frontières continue to 
operate in dangerous front-line theatres from Donetsk to Islamabad to Tripoli. Businesses such as BAE, 
Rapiscan and L-3 Systems have made a fortune from providing the latest CT technology, and hacktivists 
such as Ed Snowden have demonstrated that individuals can impact security and modern diplomacy. This 
diverse cast of actor’s figure prominently in the WoT yet little is known about their diplomatic character, 
the relations they share with each other, and the contribution they may or may not make to effective CT 
policies.
This section of the paper changes its key referent object from the state to the NGO. Only one, broad 
theoretical framework is required to understand the unique interplay of the actors described above: 
networked diplomacy. This framework is first explained in theory then validated in practice via a series of 
brief case studies which illustrate the practical, diplomatic functions many NGOs provide in the War. 
These actors, we argue, play a vital role in the WoT, particularly in terms of information gathering and 
dissemination, the provision of human security services in nations stricken by the War, and, due to their 
generally apolitical nature, their ability to liaise with, interact, and, on occasion, pacify terrorist 
organisations.  In this widened view of diplomacy, NGOs and networked diplomacy are crucial 
mechanisms that often influence security related outcomes and issues at the official, state level.
This type of analysis is not as unusual as may first appear. Since the end of the Cold War, and driven by 
successive waves of “epistemic torchbearers”, post-positivist diplomatic theory is now common in the 
Diplomatic Studies field.[63] In short, post-positivist diplomatic theory relaxes “the assumption that our 
understanding of diplomacy must be grounded in the relations of sovereign, territorial states.”[64] A view 
of diplomacy as a plural affair is encouraged, one that is better suited to the post-modern, digital era than 
archaic, traditional theories with their singular focus on the state and its diplomats. As such, post-positivist 
theories prove that the state does not have a monopoly on diplomacy, and that statist diplomacy is 
sometimes not the most effective means to enhancing a nation’s security. These ‘new’ diplomatic theories 
also adequately describe the emergence of “polylateral”[65] networks of civil society players who have 
progressively increased their influence, power, legitimacy, and credibility. Grant [66] and Melissen [67]
accurately describe these positive developments as the democratisation of diplomacy.
The framework of networked diplomacy best describes the relations between states, nations, organisations 
and people in the twenty-first century. More specifically, it can be understood as “sets of interconnected 
individuals who occupy analogous positions in institutional or social structures and create new community 
relationships that build upon, democratize, and magnify existing social frameworks.”[68] Not only does 
networked diplomacy reflect the huge volume of ‘new’ diplomatic actors it also “draws attention to the 
different interests, cultures and identities represented by states and non-state actors.”[69]
This way of thinking about diplomacy can also be easily evidenced in practice. For Hocking et. al., 
networked Diplomacy acknowledges “the growing interaction between the agents of the state and 
international organizations and non-state actors, whether located in civil society or the business 
community.”[70] In nature, these networks are dynamic, adaptable, informal and collaborative,[71] and 
support a “range of public and private actors (sans) agreed rules and norms of (traditional) diplomatic 
engagement.”[72] Robust in theory and useful in practice, networked diplomacy is arguably at its best in 
the confusing theatre of the WoT.
Like Langhorne, we also insist that the War cannot be won “by the existing machinery.”[73] Traditional 
diplomatic practice alone is insufficient, parochial and rather slow. The WoT is a complex, irregular 
conflict involving a diverse cast of state and non-state belligerents, private enterprises, insurgents, militias, 
and terrorists. Ergo, many academics have argued that the growing number of NGOs involved in both 
intra-state and supra-state struggles deem it necessary to increase their direct involvement in the 
management and resolution of those conflicts.[74] As such, a networked, diplomatic approach, both in 
theory and in practice, is vital to any chance of success in the WoT.
The most instructive example of an actor operating across various levels of modern, CT diplomatic 
networks is the NGO. Now familiar in the lexicon of international relations, there are many types, ranging 
from “operational to advocacy organisations…. loosely or hierarchically organised, networked, member 
driven or privately funded, independent or linked to government…characterised by a medley of political 
viewpoints and outlooks.”[75] NGOs continue to grow in diplomatic stature, capacity and character. They 
pursue specific political objectives, and often influence both the behaviour and interests of states. Many 
have “adopted basic diplomatic functions such as negotiation skills, visible representation, effective 
communication, filtered information and political reporting and symbolism.”[76] Global NGOs such as 
World Vision, the Aga Khan Foundation, CARE and InterAction also have flags, policy goals, 
constitutions, charters and political representatives. NGOs exhibit varying levels of political legitimacy 
and limited forms of moral sovereignty, and, if effective, often share institutionalized and ad hoc 
consultative status with large Inter-Governmental Organisation’s such as the UN. In the modern 
diplomatic environment NGOs are no longer mere “consumers of diplomacy” but proactive “producers of 
diplomatic outcomes.”[77]
NGOs have been extremely active in the WoT. Consider, for example, the singular role the Syrian 
Observatory on Human Rights has fulfilled in terms of the gathering, reporting and dissemination of 
information from the Syrian war zone. In nations and regions with dysfunctional governments, NGOs also 
fulfil an important “gap-filling” function by providing basic amenities in war torn areas where “states can 
no longer provide what the people perceive to be adequate services.[78] Since Operation Enduring 
Freedom began in October 2001, for example, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has 
provided protection and assistance to refugees, returnees, internally displaced persons, as well as co-
opting Afghan militants into the clearing of landmines around the city of Kandahar. The ICRC is also a 
valuable source of expertise, with over one hundred and fifty years’ experience of helping victims of 
international and internal armed conflicts. 
Neutrality is another useful strength of NGOs, particularly when it comes to negotiating with terrorist 
organisations. States often preach that ‘they don’t negotiate with terrorists’ (at least in theory, or in a 
direct, public manner), however, NGO’s are not so constrained. Apolitical NGOs often create avenues for 
dialogue that would never materialise for political states. The Permanent Peace Movement (PPM) and 
Geneva Call provide good examples of such a function. A Lebanese NGO founded in 1989, PPM has built 
diplomatic relationships with armed non-state actors (ANSAs) such as, Ansarullah,[79] Fatah al-Islam[80]
and Hamas in Yemen, Lebanon and the Palestinian Territories. During the Syrian Civil War, PPM staff 
have also been active in Syria, addressing issues of religious tolerance, local capacities of resilience and 
domestic security concerns with the war-torn nation.
Likewise, Geneva Call, established in Switzerland in 2000, engages directly with terrorist organisations 
such as the Afghan Taliban, Al-Shabab in Somalia and Shia militias in Iraq.[81] Geneva Call is a neutral 
organisation which “encourages ANSAs to respect international humanitarian norms in armed conflict and 
other situations of violence, in particular those related to the protection of civilians.”[82] They operate all 
over the world, from Columbia to The Democratic Republic of the Congo to The Philippines, attempting 
to replicate legitimate norm-making/treaty process, and implementing their hallmark “deed of 
commitment” whereby ANSAs “pledge to respect humanitarian norms and be held publicly accountable 
for their commitments.”[83] Their efforts have been remarkably successful. MacLeod et. al. report that by 
April, 2016, eighteen ANSAs had signed the Deed of Commitment for the Protection of Children from the 
Effects of Armed Conflict, sixteen had signed the Deed of Commitment for the Prohibition of Sexual 
Violence in Situations of Armed Conflict and towards the Elimination of Gender Discrimination, and 
forty-nine had adopted the Deed of Commitment for Adherence to a Total Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines 
and for Cooperation in Mine Action.[84]
Of broad, plural networks convened and managed by traditional state actors in war zones, NGOs often 
feature prominently. Following the 2003 Invasion of Iraq, for example, the NGO “gold rush” delivered 
many of the human security programs of the international coalition’s political objectives in Operation 
Iraqi Freedom/Operation New Dawn.[85] Oxfam, Norwegian People’s Aid, QANDIL Christian Aid, and 
many others were employed to bridge the gap between the occupying military forces and the Iraqi people, 
serving as a conduit for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and as a diplomatic intermediary in 
transmitting, with “confidence and clarity”, the George W. Bush administration’s message of peace.[86]
For states such as the U.S., the many functions NGOs provide are vital to CT efforts because they also 
create opportunities for terrorist organisations and individuals to turn away from violence.[87] During the 
WoT, NGOs such as Cultures Interactive (Germany) have established a role in processes of de-
radicalisation, conflict resolution, and peacebuilding because they are able to prioritise inclusiveness and 
partnership. Gordenker Weiss and add that these organisations also “establish new and essential lines of 
communication to introduce ideas, train individuals and help create alternate institutions.”[88] In doing so 
NGOs create complimentary, over-lapping diplomatic networks where peaceful norms are replicated and, 
on occasion, accepted by ANSAs, which can ideally hasten transition toward non-violent political actions. 
Little wonder then that former U.S. Secretary of State Powell labelled NSAs a “force multiplier” in the 
War on Terror.[89] Unsung diplomatic heroes, they are often found on the frontlines of the War, serving as 
vital conduits for information flows both in and out of combat zones, imparting expertise and region 
specific information on the operational environment, as well as championing and representing human and 
social concerns in CT policy debates.[90] To repeat, if any hope of winning the War is to be entertained, 
states must recognise, support, legitimise and tap into these vast networks of new diplomatic actors.
The Diplomacy of Terror
At first glance TOs seem anything but diplomatic. They intentionally target combatants and non-
combatants and engage in shocking acts of violence. Their actions are criminal and unlawful, and they 
demonstrate complete indifference to international norms, treaties, conventions and laws. For many 
outside observers it is difficult to see beyond the barbarism of TOs. However, most of them, even the 
nihilistic ones, have political goals they seek to realise through many means – violence, alliances with 
criminal organisations, exploitation of new ICTs, and, the subject of this section, diplomacy.
This area of inquiry is not as controversial as it first appears. Diplomatic analyses of TOs are quite 
common. Deos and Pigman’s work on the Good Friday process in Northern Ireland, or Powell’s detailed 
case-study analysis of Basque separatists (ETA), the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the Palestinian 
Liberation Organisation (PLO), are good examples.[91] This section of the paper also “risks suspicion” of 
“having sympathy with the terrorist devil” by describing the diplomacy of TOs in the WoT.[92] It does so 
to complement this body of literature described above and, we hope, lead to more realistic and objective 
CT strategies. Labelling TOs as criminal, medieval, violent, cave-dwelling barbarians is both incorrect 
and dangerous, in that the allies in the War continue to underestimate the offensive capabilities of the 
‘enemy.’ If such an enemy is to be effectively countered and ultimately defeated, then describing and 
charting their diplomatic capability is important. Of course, TOs that intentionally target and murder 
innocent civilians are malodourous, repugnant and must be stopped. To do so, however, is to expose and 
examine a means besides terror they employ on a daily basis: diplomacy.
This diplomatic capacity is a hallmark of Hamas and Hizballah as well as global jihadist movements such 
as al Qa’ida, ISIL and their respective franchises. For Crenshaw, new terrorism centres on “the increasing 
lethality of terrorism and the role of religion” in motivating large-scale, mass attacks on non-combatants.
[93]
 This motivational and tactical ‘evolution’[94] draws inspiration from a violent interpretation of sacred 
Islamic texts, targets both the near (apostate civilians and/or politicians) and far enemy (western nations 
such as the U.S. or France, the United Kingdom or Belgium), and seeks to re-establish the Islamic 
Caliphate, to name but a few of new terrorism’s objectives. In pursuit of such a grand strategy, TOs 
practice some forms of diplomacy. A few have overseas embassies staffed by representatives, others 
gather and disseminate information, all communicate messages via old and new media, and several, as 
they grow more sophisticated, become adroit negotiators. Each of these diplomatic functions is explored 
below, using the TO as our key referent object. 
First, and in terms of representation, more than a few TOs have a political office or embassy, staffed by 
individuals who symbolise the group core interests. This is nothing new. As they mature, some TOs 
develop political capacities. In 2013, the Afghan Taliban made headline news around the world when, 
they opened their first official overseas office in Doha, Qatar. Populated by roughly twenty individuals, 
the office gives the Taliban a degree of political legitimacy, a fixed, known address, and a number of 
skilled representatives who can openly talk, meet and travel. During the past three years Taliban 
representatives have participated in conferences and meetings in Germany, Japan and France, and actively 
seek to pressure sovereign states. In September, 2016, for example, the Taliban demanded the Indian 
government reconsider a multi-million dollar, NATO endorsed, deal which would deliver military 
equipment to the Afghan government. A Taliban spokesman called “on India to stop exporting items of 
killing and destruction to Afghanistan and to stop efforts of prolonging the lifespan of this corrupt regime 
with its military aid”.[95] The Al Qa’ida linked Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (formerly Al Nusra Front) also 
engages in diplomatic representation. A central protagonist in Syrian Civil War, Jabhat Fateh al-Sham 
participates in the Turkish based Syrian Islamic Council, the Syrian Revolution General Commission, the 
Supreme Military Council Command and the High Negotiation Committee (the primary representative 
body for the Syrian opposition involved in the Geneva Peace Talks). And, in September 2016, 
representatives from the narco-terrorist organisation Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia 
(FARC) assembled in Cartagena to sign a peace agreement with the Columbian government. This historic 
agreement marked the end of fifty-two years of conflict between the state and FARC which killed 26,000 
and left more than six million internally displaced.
Second, TOs also are more than capable negotiators, particularly when their power begins to waver. 
Recognising this ability has been vital to the de-escalation of unconventional conflicts involving TOs the 
world over. The various Declarations of Peace in Northern Ireland during the 1990’s, for instance, or the 
cease-fire Agreement with the Basque separatists ETA in 2011, followed decades of secret negotiations 
between states and terrorist negotiators. More recently, the incumbent Afghanistan President Ashraf Ghani 
realised the value of ‘negotiating with terrorists’ as a crucial step toward greater national and regional 
stability. In 2016 the Afghan government entered into negotiations with Hizb-e-Islami, a domestic 
political and paramilitary organisation led by former Afghan Prime Minister Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. 
Although Hekmatyar and his group were proscribed as terrorists by the U.S. Department of State, 
President Ghani realised the value of pacifying Hizb-e-Islami across the negotiating table as opposed to a 
protracted and bloody anti-terror campaign. The gesture, the frank and cordial atmosphere during talks, 
and the signed, formal peace agreement was highly symbolic for the war-ravaged nation because it was 
the first domestic peace initiative that had no foreign state or UN mediation. Afghan watchers are hopeful 
the peace agreement might even encourage some Taliban leaders to consider a similar path.
Third, all TOs communicate political and diplomatic messages via old and new media. Indeed, violence 
itself is a form of communication. As Kurth Cronin adroitly notes, “the targets of a terrorist episode are 
not simply the victims who are killed or maimed in an attack but governments, publics, or constituents 
among whom the terrorists hope to engender a reaction-such as fear, repulsion, intimidation, overreaction, 
or radicalisation.”[96] This violence-as-communication is also known in terrorism parlance as 
“propaganda by the deed,” a statement attributed to Russian and French anarchist’s Kropotkin and 
Brousse.[97] One main objective of terrorism is to create fear in a wider audience, conducive to 
proselyting a message or edging the organisation closer to a political goal. This message (propaganda) or 
affect (deed) can be greatly amplified by violent actions across various types of media.
TOs are masters of exploiting media for the dissemination of a political message. As Der Derian notes, 
international terrorism is carefully stage managed as “a televisual strategic simulation choreographed by 
violence and staged for a fearful captive global audience.”[98] The live broadcast of the PLFP blowing up 
three El Al jetliners on Dawson’s Field, Jordan in 1970, the Munich Olympic Games tragedy of 1972, and 
the strikes on the Twin Towers in Manhattan in 2001 are all infamous examples of TOs conducting 
violent shocking acts with a salacious media in mind. After the Munich tragedy, Jamal Al-Gashey a 
member of the radical Black September Group which carried out the attack, quite rightly noted that:
... a bomb in the White House, a mine in the Vatican, the death of Mao-Tse-tung, an earthquake in 
Paris could not have echoed through the consciousness of every man in the world like the 
operation at Munich . . . the choice of the Olympics, from a purely propagandistic viewpoint was 
100 percent successful. It was like painting the name of Palestine on a mountain that can be seen 
from the four corners of the earth.[99]
Little has changed since 1972. The leader of Al Qa’ida Ayman al Zawahiri once told Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi (the deceased founder of AQI) that “we are in a battle, and…more than half of this battle is 
taking place in the battlefield of the media.”[100] Similarly, al Shahab jihadist Omar Hammami declared 
“the war of narratives has become more even important than the war of navies, napalm, and knives.”[101]
No wonder then that AQAP recruiter, Anwar al-Awlaki was a master of media manipulation, and even 
produced a monthly, glossy magazine named Inspire. ISIL, perhaps the most media-savvy of the lot, has 
its own magazine (Dabiq), news agency (The Amaq News Agency), and actively recruited specialists such 
as  Junaid Hussain (Hussain al-Britani), Nasser Muthana (Abu Muthana al-Yemeni) and Raphael Hostey 
(Abu Qaqa) for their ICT and media expertise.[102] ISIL’s twitter army of supporters, “bots and apps”[103]
produce as many as 100,000 “vibrant and self-reinforcing” tweets a day.[104] Indeed, a large body of 
research[105] unequivocally proves that modern TOs use Twitter, YouTube, Telegram, and even the Sony 
PS4 as capability extenders, whether that be to recruit, terrify, or dominate the virtual, global battlefield of 
the WoT.  Such aptitude, once more, confirms that TOs are far more sophisticated diplomatic actors than 
their violent veneer first suggests.
Recommendations for Theorists and Practitioners
The diplomatic studies field has consistently demonstrated its value to countering terrorism. Several 
noteworthy studies populate the canon[106] and this body of work served as a starting point for this paper 
which described, mapped and validated different types of diplomacy in the WoT. Other, more critical 
works will and should follow. The final section presents a number of related theoretical and practical 
recommendations. Diplomacy, the paper contends, is preferable to decades of further conflict.
In terms of theory, much work lies ahead. This paper, for one, did not actually review, laud or lambast the 
effectiveness of diplomacy in the WoT. Having demonstrated its prevalence, a second paper could ask if 
diplomacy has been a success or failure in the WoT? The answer to this question depends on perspective, 
of course, which a deeper, targeted inquiry would reveal. Judging the efficacy or failure of traditional 
diplomacy would be a particularly fecund area. In the case of the U.S. for example, many often point to 
the chaos left in the aftermath of the Afghanistan or Iraq interventions as evidence of failure. To jump on 
that bandwagon, however, is to forget the principle of the both the Bush and Obama regimes: prevent 
another 9/11-style attack on U.S. soil, no matter the cost. Similar insights abound in the context of NGO 
diplomacy in the War, or the diplomatic strategy of ISIL, for example.
More challenging diplomatic scholarship on the WoT could also boost interest by outsiders in the field of 
Diplomatic Studies. To state the obvious, diplomatic scholars realise the value of diplomatic perspectives 
on security issues such as the WoT. However, the same cannot be said of the broader IR discipline. In the 
U.S., for example, diplomatic scholarship continues to be overshadowed by Security Studies scholarship, 
degree programs and publications, while Strategic Studies and Foreign Policy Analysis attracts far more 
funding, students and interest than Diplomatic Studies.[107] The beltway between IR’s ivory towers and 
the proverbial coal face has also been busy. American academics working in popular fields of study have 
had unprecedented access to policy makers developing, implementing and evaluating U.S. government CT 
strategy. The result of this dominance is a body of research skewed toward fighting the War rather than 
mitigating it through peaceful, diplomatic means, channels and policies. A key job for Diplomatic Studies 
scholars, therefore, is to continue to demonstrate the value of diplomatic theory in understanding the WoT, 
with a view to ultimately stopping it. It is hoped that this paper is the first of many theoretical studies on 
diplomacy and the WoT to come.
Better diplomatic theory on the War should, in time, translate to an increased application in the practice of 
diplomacy. After all, hard power has its limitations, particularly when fighting a “shadow.”[108] Of 
course, the military will continue to be of crucial importance in the fight against terrorism. Besides combat 
operations, it plays a vital role in managing intelligence, upholding strategic alliances, and unifying 
strategic and tactical responses to terrorism.[109] However, a unilateral military approach, where armed 
forces become the sole, “default responder” to irregular, complex and dynamic conflicts like the WoT, is 
doomed to fail.[110] If, after all, all you have is a hammer then everything looks like a nail.
Arguably, as this paper has demonstrated, diplomacy is an equally effective and practical weapon for 
allied states in the WoT. Done well, it is also cheaper and more durable than hard, military oriented 
solutions. Such versatility is evident in many conflict situations where diplomacy has proved to be an 
important mechanism in the de-escalation of intractable conflicts, from Bosnia, Northern Ireland and 
South Africa to Mozambique, Nepal and El Salvador. All of these violent disputes were resolved 
diplomatically, challenging the belief that “wars traditionally ended when one party defeated the other on 
the battlefield.”[111] Even in conflicts where diplomacy has not ended the violence, such as 
Israel–Palestine, Sri Lanka, Kashmir, Mindanao, and the Korea peninsula “on-going negotiations between 
the warring parties have rarely been off the table.”[112]
The first practical recommendation this paper makes, therefore, is that diplomacy should compete with the 
military (or, at least, complement) as the default responder in the WoT. A voluminous body of research 
has demonstrated that the best weapon against terrorism is not more violence but either politicization 
(choosing a political path), or effective and sustainable CT…or both.[113] This paper agrees, asserting that 
defence diplomacy, in particular, where the military and MFA strategise, implement and review CT 
strategies on a regular, collaborative and institutionalised basis, is crucial to effectively fighting and 
winning the War.
A second practical recommendation, in terms of winning, is for states to establish, manage and sustain CT 
networks composed of NGOs and other non-state actors (NSAs). As former commander of Joint Special 
Operations in Iraq, and U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal insisted “it 
takes a network to defeat a network.”[114] There are three obvious benefits to bedding down a network 
approach to CT. First, plural CT networks better synchronise the skills, resources and expertise of the 
private sector, which then creates an enhanced level of situational awareness and response. Second, by 
their cooperative nature diplomacy centred CT networks would avoid stove-piping of information, and 
facilitate collaboration between states, NGO’s, IGO’s, the private sector, the media, traditional and 
religious leaders as well as other key stakeholders. A whole of society approach, we maintain, is better 
than a whole-of-government strategy. And, third, a collaborative CT effort could reduce or mitigate the 
transference of terrorism, whereby the violence simply moves to another region or state in response to 
traditional military pressure by replicating strategy and capabilities among a broader network of global CT 
partners. 
Kerr and Wiseman are two renowned diplomatic scholars to assert that “more and more global actors are 
demanding that diplomacy, rather than military force, be used to settle differences.”[115] This paper is no 
different. To win the War, more diplomacy is required, not less. Of course, there will always be 
disenfranchised individuals and groups that will resort to terrorism, however with good diplomatic theory 
and practice it is possible to discourage and diminish its impact. A diplomatic approach can change 
terrorism “from a grave strategic threat to a dangerous nuisance,” one that can be isolated, contained, and, 
eventually, neutered.[116] The WoT is in its fifteenth year, yet despite all the money, ‘boots on the 
ground’, and mainstream IR scholarship it shows no sign of abating. This paper is not so naïve to think 
that diplomacy is a hitherto undiscovered panacea. It firmly believes, however, that diplomacy has played 
a pivotal, central and hitherto understudied role in the WoT. To neglect it in theory and practice is 
anathema to any hope of ultimately mitigating a threat that grows more virulent with every passing day.
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